



ALL TOGETHER NOW: INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
RESPONSE TO THE LIBOR RATE SETTING CONSPIRACY 
Melissa Anne Conrad-Alam* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 492 
II. BACKGROUND: LIBOR ................................................................... 493 
A.  The History of LIBOR: Growth of LIBOR to the World’s 
Most Important Number ........................................................... 494 
B. LIBOR Explained: LIBOR’s Impact on the Global 
Economic Marketplace ............................................................. 494 
C. The World’s Most Important Number: The Impact of 
LIBOR on Global Financial Markets ....................................... 496 
D. LIBOR in Scandal: The Conspiracy to Set the LIBOR Rate 
and the Impact on Global Economic Markets .......................... 496 
E. Who was Minding the Store? The Historic Regulation of 
LIBOR in the U.K. .................................................................... 498 
III. NATIONAL REGULATORY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL 
BANKING CRISES: THE TENSIONS IN ENFORCING BANKING 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMIC MARKET ........................... 500 
A. Why the Ten-Point Plan? The Underlying Policy Goals of 
the Recommendations by the Wheatley Review ........................ 501 
B. The Ten-Point Plan: Recommendations to the U.K. for a 
National Response to the LIBOR Rate-Setting Scandal ........... 504 
C. International Regulatory Responses: Fitting LIBOR into 
Current Models for International Regulatory Response .......... 514 
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 517 
                                                                                                                   
  *  J.D., University of Georgia, 2014; M.S.W., University of Georgia, 2005; B.A., 
Oglethorpe University, 2002. 
492 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:491 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory agencies of seven different countries and regions are 
currently investigating an alleged conspiracy by sixteen major international 
banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) during a 
period of at least two years, coinciding with the decline of the world 
economy in 2007–2008.1  LIBOR began in 1986 as a tool for banks to use in 
setting a common interest rate for loans that the banks issued jointly, but it 
grew to become the “world’s most important number.”2  Today, around the 
world, financial institutions, investment markets, mortgage companies, and 
private investment funds use LIBOR as the reference point for determining 
interest rates.3  In this way, LIBOR impacts “trillions of dollars in financial 
instruments worldwide.”4  Around the world, regulators, private entities, and 
other government institutions accused the sixteen banks on the LIBOR board 
of submitting false information to the entity that sets LIBOR in order to 
manipulate the rate.5  The alleged purpose of this manipulation was two-fold: 
(1) to generate higher returns on bank investments and financial tools and (2) 
to hide the growing riskiness of the banks’ debts, and in turn financial 
distress, as the world economy began to crumble.6  The impact of this 
conspiracy is international in scope, affecting the profits earned by financial 
institutions, investors, pension funds, and national, state, and local 
governments. 
While the regulatory agencies of many countries are now investigating 
the impact of this conspiracy within their borders, the responsibility for 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Consol. Amended Complaint for Mayor and City Council of Balt. at 3, In re LIBOR-
Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB), 
2012 WL 1522306 [hereinafter Consol. Amended Complaint Balt.].  In 2011, a series of class-
action lawsuits was filed in the United States against the sixteen banks that make up the 
LIBOR rate-setting board.  The lawsuits initially filed make up a series of complaints, but all 
of which allege injuries from the alleged conspiracy to set LIBOR below the market rate.  
These complaints describe much of the background of the conspiracy, as well as the current 
regulatory efforts to control it.  The lawsuits are ongoing.   
 2 David Enrich & Max Colchester, Before Scandal, Clash Over Control of LIBOR, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 11, 2012, at A1 (describing the struggle by the British Bankers’ Association 
(BBA) to ensure the integrity of LIBOR in the wake of evidence of manipulation by BBA 
members, increasing pressure from regulators from abroad, and the early hands-off approach 
taken by the Bank of England). 
 3 Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 2.  
 4 Id.  
 5 Id. at 2–3.  
 6 Id. at 2; Peter J. Henning, In UBS Convictions, Parallels to the LIBOR Investigation, 
DEALBOOK, Sept. 4, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 18820693.  
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regulating the LIBOR setting process fell on the U.K., as LIBOR is set daily 
by the British Bankers’ Association.7  This Note will examine international 
pressures on the U.K. to regulate LIBOR prior to the uncovering of the 
conspiracy to manipulate the rate.  Additionally, the Note will lay out the 
U.K.’s proposed solutions to the crisis through an examination of the 
Wheatley Review of LIBOR, which lays out a blueprint for LIBOR reform.8  
This Note will then examine existing international banking regulatory 
mechanisms and how the Wheatley Review’s proposed solutions may fit into 
these existing structures.  Finally, this Note will present future issues that 
must be addressed in order to fill the growing need for stronger international 
mechanisms for banking regulation as banking continues to expand to global 
markets.  Of particular importance is how to address the need for an 
international enforcement mechanism in the banking industry. 
II.  BACKGROUND: LIBOR 
First, to understand the need for an international response to the LIBOR 
scandal, one must understand the vital role that LIBOR plays in international 
financial markets.  Often called the “world’s most important number,” 
LIBOR is the rate against which the interest rates for trillions of dollars of 
financial instruments around the world are set.9  
LIBOR is an invention of the British Bankers’ Association (BBA),10 a 
trade association for the United Kingdom’s (UK) banking and financial 
industry.  The BBA represents more than 170 banks from 180 countries.11  
The BBA’s self-described role is “to promote a legislative and regulatory 
system for banking and financial services—in the UK, Europe and 
internationally—which takes account of [BBA] members’ needs and 
concerns.”12  While on the one hand, the BBA is essentially a lobbying group 
on behalf of its members,13 it also oversaw the setting of LIBOR for the past 
                                                                                                                   
 7 Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 2. 
 8 Her Majesty’s Treasury, The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report (2012), available 
at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf [hereinafter 
The Wheatley Review]. 
 9 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2; Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 2.  
 10 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2; About Us, BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, http://www.bba. 
org.uk/about-us (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) [hereinafter BBA About Us].  
 11 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  
 12 BBA About Us, supra note 10.  
 13 Id.  
494 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:491 
 
 
thirty years.14  So, how did what started out as a trade association and 
advocacy center for the U.K. banking industry come to oversee the world’s 
most important number?  
A.  The History of LIBOR: Growth of LIBOR to the World’s Most Important 
Number 
In short, it happened by accident.  LIBOR was never intended to be such 
an integral part of the world market.15  The BBA created LIBOR in the 1980s 
as a response to the desire of members to create an easier way to set 
collective interest rates for a new type of financial product, Forward Rate 
Agreements.  Forward Rate Agreements were unique in that they required 
parties to agree to the interest rates underlying the products at the outset.16  
The BBA member banks asked the BBA to facilitate these agreements by 
developing a benchmark that could be used to set these interest rates.17  
Thus, in 1984 the BBA standard for Interest Settlement rates 
(BBAIRS)—LIBOR’s predecessor—was born.18  From 1985 to 1986 the use 
of the BBAIRS became standard practice by banks in setting the rates for 
Forward Swap Agreements and other types of financial tools.  In 1986, the 
BBA published LIBOR for the first time, offered in three different 
currencies: the U.S. Dollar, the Japanese Yen, and the British Pound.  
LIBOR had begun.19 
B.  LIBOR Explained: LIBOR’s Impact on the Global Economic Marketplace 
In essence, LIBOR is the interest rate at which BBA member banks 
believe they would be able to borrow money on the global market.20  The 
rate is set in ten different currencies daily, based on the reports of member 
                                                                                                                   
 14 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  In this article, the authors address the apparent 
growing tension between the BBA’s role as a trade association and its position as the overseer 
(and for all intents and purposes the regulator) of LIBOR.  Additionally, the authors describe 
the ongoing conversations between the BBA and regulators, such as the Bank of England and 
the Federal Reserve Board of New York.  
 15 Id.  
 16 BBALIBOR Explained: Historical Perspective, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/ 
explained/historical-perspective. 
 17 Id.  
 18 Id.  
 19 Id.  
 20 BBALIBOR Explained: The Basics, BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, http://www.bbalibor.com/ 
bbalibor-explained/the-basics [hereinafter BBALIBOR Basics]. 
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banks about their perceived individual ability to borrow funds on the global 
market.21  In the same way that consumer credit card rates indicate the 
riskiness of lending to that particular borrower, the individual bank’s 
reported rate to LIBOR is supposed to reveal how risky a loan to a BBA 
member bank is at the time of reporting, because the rate should indicate on 
how much interest another bank would charge the member to borrow 
money.22  Just as a credit card company charges a higher interest rate to a 
consumer with a low credit score based on the risk that the company will not 
be repaid, a lending bank will charge a higher interest rate on a loan to 
another bank if the lending bank perceives that the bank receiving the loan 
may not be able to pay that loan back. 
LIBOR is calculated daily based on submissions by a group of BBA 
member banks that sit on the LIBOR panel for each of the ten different 
currencies.23  For example, sixteen different banks made up the board for the 
U.S. Dollar LIBOR rate during the mid-to-late 2000s.24  Some of the banks 
overlap currencies; for example nine of the sixteen banks that made up the 
U.S. Dollar LIBOR panel during the late mid-to-late 2000s also “served on 
the Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, and Euro LIBOR panels.”25  The banks that 
sit on LIBOR panels call into the BBA daily to give a submission, based on 
the following question: “[A]T WHAT RATE COULD YOU BORROW FUNDS, WERE 
YOU TO DO SO BY ASKING FOR AND THEN ACCEPTING INTER-BANK OFFERS IN A 
REASONABLE MARKET SIZE JUST PRIOR TO 11 AM?.”26  
The banks’ submissions do not need to be based on actual borrowing 
rates, as every bank will not attempt to borrow funds daily.27  Instead, a bank 
might calculate its perceived borrowing rate based on its credit and liquidity 
risk profile.28  The bank then can construct a curve to predict the correct rate 
for currencies or maturities in which it has not been actively borrowing on 
any particular day.29  Once each bank on a LIBOR panel makes its daily 
submissions, the BBA then takes an average of the submissions to set 
LIBOR for each currency.30  
                                                                                                                   
 21 Id.; Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 8.  
 22 BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20; Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 9.  
 23 Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 9.  
 24 Id. at 8.  
 25 Id.  
 26 BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20.  
 27 Id.  
 28 Id.  
 29 Id.  
 30 Consol. Amended Complaint for Balt., supra note 1, at 9.  
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The average is not taken from all submissions, however.  BBA attempts 
to eliminate outliers in the submission pool by dropping the highest 25% and 
the lowest 25% of submissions each day.31  The rate is then published by 
Thomson Reuters, and reported along with the submissions of the individual 
banks on which the BBA based its calculation.32  Banks are not allowed to 
see other banks’ submissions until after the rate is published.33  
C.  The World’s Most Important Number: The Impact of LIBOR on Global 
Financial Markets 
Once used only to set the rates for financial instruments between banks, 
LIBOR rates now impact almost every industry, consumer, and financial tool 
in the global market.34  LIBOR is the benchmark for setting short-term 
interest rates globally.35  When most types of commercial financial contracts 
are entered into around the world, LIBOR determines the interest rate, 
whether for a sophisticated derivatives contract, a commercial loan for a 
small business, a family’s mortgage, or a credit card.36  It is astonishing that 
all of these financial contracts are based on a rate that is entirely 
unregulated.37 
D.  LIBOR in Scandal: The Conspiracy to Set the LIBOR Rate and the 
Impact on Global Economic Markets 
In the last few years, the banks that make up the LIBOR panel have been 
accused of colluding to artificially suppress the LIBOR rate by international 
regulatory agencies and private parties alike.38  Seven countries and political 
entities, including the United States, Switzerland, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, the European Union, and Singapore, instituted civil and 
criminal investigations into the alleged manipulation.39  In 2011 the first 
lawsuits against the sixteen banks that made up the U.S. Dollar LIBOR board 
were filed, alleging, among other claims, antitrust violations marked by a 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Id.  
 32 Id.  
 33 BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20.  
 34 Id.; Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  
 35 BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20.  
 36 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  
 37 Id.  
 38 Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 9.  
 39 Id. at 3.  
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conspiracy to set the LIBOR rate.40  And by the spring of 2012, the U.S. and 
U.K. regulators had uncovered evidence that the BBA member banks that 
make up the LIBOR panels manipulated the LIBOR rate.41    
These accusations stem from evidence that the LIBOR rate did not match 
up to other information regarding the health of the banks and the overall 
economy.42  Banks on the LIBOR panel could potentially benefit from the 
artificial suppression of LIBOR in two ways.43  First, by underreporting their 
LIBOR submission, a bank could cover its precarious financial positions and 
lower the level of risk associated with that bank.44  This picture of financial 
health became particularly important in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, 
when financial markets started becoming particularly wary of increasing 
investment risk.45  A higher LIBOR submission by any bank indicated more 
need of cash to cover poorly-performing investments and, in turn, a higher 
risk for anyone lending to that bank.46   
Second, by lowering the LIBOR rate, a bank could pay lower interest 
rates on any of the LIBOR-based financial instruments that bank sold to 
investors.47  As discussed above, LIBOR is the global standard for all short-
term interest rates, so if a bank sells a security to a pension fund, for 
example, when the LIBOR rate goes up so does the rate of return on that 
investment.  This relationship between the rate of return and LIBOR means 
that the bank has to pay a higher rate of return to the pension fund and, as a 
result, loses money.  For example, in 2009 JPMorgan Chase reported that if 
interest rates increased by 1%, the bank would lose over $500 million.48  
Therefore, by artificially suppressing rates, the banks on the LIBOR panel 
could both conceal the apparent riskiness of their current financial status and 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Id. at 2; Amended Consol. Class Action Complaint for Exchange-based Plaintiffs, In re 
LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 2262, 11 Civ. 
2613.), 2012 WL 1522305, at 1. 
 41 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  
 42 Consol. Amended Complaint Balt., supra note 1, at 10–15 (describing the work of 
independent consultants hired in anticipation of litigation to determine whether the LIBOR 
rate appeared to be artificially suppressed based on other financial data, as well as discussing a 
variety of news articles describing concerns about the seemingly low LIBOR rates).  
 43 Id. at 9 (describing the alleged financial incentives of LIBOR member banks to keep 
LIBOR rates low generally and particularly to suppress the LIBOR rate during the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008). 
 44 Id.  
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at 10.  
 47 Id.  
 48 Id.  
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also keep from having to pay out large sums in interest owed to investors on 
their products.49   
From a plaintiff’s perspective, artificial suppression causes an owner of 
any product with an interest rate set to LIBOR to lose money owed to the 
owner during the period of suppression.50  Additionally, anyone buying an 
investment with a risk calculation based on LIBOR is actually exposed to 
greater risk than the reported LIBOR rate indicated.51  The lawsuits against 
the banks stem from these types of alleged losses.52  
E.  Who was Minding the Store? The Historic Regulation of LIBOR in the 
U.K. 
No regulatory agency oversees the setting of LIBOR by the BBA, which 
is a private entity.53  In fact, the administration of and submission to LIBOR 
currently fall under no statutory authority at all.54  Therefore the ongoing 
regulatory investigations by countries are proceeding only by connecting 
LIBOR to already regulated banking activities.  However, as the rate is set in 
London by a British organization the main purview for overseeing the 
regulation of the group falls either with the Bank of England, the U.K.’s 
Central Bank (akin in its role to the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank), H.M. 
Treasury (similar to the U.S. Treasury Department), or the Financial Services 
Authority (a nongovernmental entity established to oversee banking in the 
U.K.).55  In 2007, the Bank of England held a meeting where executives of 
several banks indicated that they were concerned that LIBOR seemed 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. at 2–3 (describing the specific alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiffs here, as well 
as the general role that LIBOR plays in investments, and the harm that necessarily stems from 
the LIBOR rate being set artificially low). 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 8.  
 54 The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 11 (describing the need to move LIBOR under the 
statutory regulatory authority of a U.K. regulatory body). 
 55 About the Bank: Core Purposes, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/abo 
ut/Pages/corepurposes/default.aspx; Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the 
Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bankof 
england.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/mou.pdf [hereinafter UK Regulatory Body MOU] 
(describing the delineation of duties and the relationship between the key U.K. banking 
regulatory institutions: HM Treasury, the Bank of England, and the FSA);   Who are we?, 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/who [hereinafter FSA Who].  
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artificially low.56  Concerns were expressed that perhaps LIBOR contributor 
banks were underreporting borrowing rates in an attempt to stave off 
concerns about shaky financial conditions.57  In spite of these concerns, 
however, the Bank of England declined to take action at the time, given that 
the BBA assured the group that the current rate-setting process was sufficient 
to prevent any such problems.58   
But the concerns about potential underreporting did not go away.  In 2008 
The Wall Street Journal began reporting about the apparent problems with 
LIBOR calculation, setting off a series of articles highlighting the red flags 
surrounding the rate’s integrity.59  After the first article was printed, the BBA 
immediately sent a memo to all the banks as a reminder to make honest 
submissions about its rates.60  Additionally, the BBA contacted the Bank of 
England to discuss the regulator engaging in a process, along with the U.S. 
Federal Reserve, to develop a framework for the regulators to provide 
oversight to LIBOR.61  However the Bank of England declined to participate, 
and eventually the Federal Reserve backed out as well.62  Neither entity 
wanted to be seen as officially endorsing the rate or the BBA’s review of the 
rate.63  These decisions again left LIBOR in the hands of the BBA, which 
oversees LIBOR through a separate legal entity, BBA LIBOR Ltd.64 
The impact that LIBOR has on financial markets is incalculable, and the 
fact that the U.K. regulators had no direct oversight authority may be partly 
responsible for creating an opportunity for a conspiracy to thrive.  The 
LIBOR scandal revealed just how much one country’s regulatory institutions 
can impact the entire world market.  In order to solve this problem, each 
country cannot be left to the whim of the government’s political attitudes 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  
 57 Id.  
 58 Id.  
 59 A long series of articles was released in the Wall Street Journal beginning in 2008 
describing the building concerns over LIBOR, tracking the investigations by international 
regulatory bodies, and examining private litigation resulting from the conspiracy.  For a small 
sampling, see Carrick Mollenkamp, Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 16, 2008; Carrick Mollenkamp, LIBOR Surges after Scrutiny Does, Too, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 18, 2008; Carrick Mollenkamp, LIBOR’s Accuracy Becomes Issue Again, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 24, 2008.  
 60 Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. 
 63 Id.  
 64 BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20; Enrich & Colchester, supra note 2.  
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toward regulation at a given time or in a given market; instead, a common 
solution must be developed.  
Over the last several months, regulators around the world have been 
meeting to discuss the future of LIBOR, and the U.K. Government has 
released “The Wheatley Review,” a ten-point plan for re-tooling LIBOR in 
the wake of the rate-setting conspiracy.65  This Note explores the Wheatley 
Review’s regulatory solutions and compares those solutions to international 
responses to past crises and the effectiveness of current international banking 
regulatory bodies.  Additionally, this Note explores the tension of a proposed 
national regulatory solution in the wake of a problem with vast international 
impacts.  Finally, this Note proposes finding an international solution that 
can address the problems raised by the LIBOR conspiracy.  
III.  NATIONAL REGULATORY RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
CRISES: THE TENSIONS IN ENFORCING BANKING REGULATION IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC MARKET 
For more than twenty years, national regulatory bodies of the banking 
industry have acknowledged the need for international cooperation to 
regulate financial instruments, particularly derivatives.66  There already exist 
several international regulatory bodies, such as the Bank for International 
Settlements’ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) 
and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), that 
issue guidelines developed cooperatively with their different memberships, 
which are then implemented by the national regulatory institutions that 
comprise those bodies.67  These committees do not have any independent 
regulatory or enforcement power but instead use international cooperation 
among national regulators to develop guidelines for the global banking 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Her Majesty’s Treasury, Independent Review into Libor Published, Sept. 28, 2012, at 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_pn_280912.htm. 
 66 Thomas C. Singher, Regulating Derivatives: Does Transnational Regulatory Cooperation 
Offer a Viable Alternative to Congressional Action, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1397, 1461–68 
(1995). 
 67 Id. at 1461–63 (describing the role of these bodies in issuing guidelines for the regulation 
of derivatives-related risks); About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm/ [hereinafter About Basel Committee]; 
IOSCO Historical Background, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=background [hereinafter IOSCO Historical 
Background]. 
2014] ALL TOGETHER NOW  501 
 
 
market, and those guidelines are then implemented and enforced by each 
body’s respective members.68  
This type of international cooperation, while it provides some level of 
international cohesiveness in regulatory policy, still leaves much of the 
regulatory policy-setting in banking to national entities.  This level of 
national autonomy in an increasingly global world leaves open the question 
of how national regulators take into account the global impacts of their 
regulatory decisions and how regulatory bodies with no jurisdiction over key 
global economic measures or entities, such as BBALIBOR, ward off coming 
global crises. 
First, this section examines the proposed U.K. plan for shifting the 
regulatory structure of LIBOR, and the sufficiency of that plan in taking into 
account the international impacts of the conspiracy to fix LIBOR.  Next, it 
examines how current Basel Committee and IOSCO policies and 
enforcement mechanisms may come into play in the enforcement and 
implementation of such new regulations.  
A.  Why the Ten-Point Plan? The Underlying Policy Goals of the 
Recommendations by the Wheatley Review 
In 2009, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the U.K. collaborated 
with regulators in a number of nations to investigate LIBOR misconduct.69  
The FSA is a non-governmental entity in the U.K. empowered by the British 
Parliament to regulate and supervise banks in cooperation with Her 
Majesty’s (H.M.) Treasury and the Bank of England.70  As a result of the 
investigations, the FSA announced in June 2012 that it would be fining 
Barclays Bank £59.5 million for that bank’s role in the 2012 LIBOR rate-
setting crisis.71  
                                                                                                                   
 68 Singher, supra note 66, at 1465; IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 67; About 
Basel Committee, supra note 67.  
 69 The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 5 (describing how the Wheatley Review provided 
an overview of the report).  
 70 FSA Who, supra note 55; UK Regulatory Body MOU, supra note 55.  
 71 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, BARCLAYS FINED £59.5 MILLION FOR SIGNIFICANT 
FAILINGS IN RELATION TO LIBOR AND EURIBOR, June 27, 2012, FSA/PN/070/2012, 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/070.shtml [hereinafter 
FSA Barclays Findings] (reproducing the final report of the FSA’s findings that Barclays’s 
had engaged in continuous misconduct in regards to LIBOR including: making submissions 
that unlawfully took into account requests from the bank’s interest rate derivatives traders in 
order to benefit bank trading positions; seeking to influence submissions of other banks 
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Following that announcement, the British government called on Martin 
Wheatley to conduct a review of the setting and usage of LIBOR.72  
Wheatley is the current director of the FSA, and also is the CEO designate of 
a new U.K. regulatory body to be established within the next year, the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).73  The purpose of the Wheatley Review 
was to look not at the specific allegations regarding any particular bank’s or 
individual’s attempts to manipulate LIBOR;74 instead the review was 
intended to examine LIBOR for the purpose of making recommendations for 
reform to the British Government, the BBA, banks, and other regulatory 
bodies.75  The Report examines opportunities to regulate and reform LIBOR 
itself, but it also examines whether an alternative benchmark should replace 
LIBOR and makes recommendations about the future of LIBOR and other 
potential interest rate setting benchmarks.76  Ultimately, the Wheatley 
Review lays out a ten-point plan for the reformation of LIBOR without any 
recommendation to actually end the use of the benchmark.77 
Three conclusions shape the foundation of this ten-point plan.78  First, the 
Wheatley Review concluded that, at least in the short term, rather than 
replacing LIBOR with an alternate benchmark, efforts should focus on 
reforming it.79  One reason for this conclusion is the interest in limiting risk 
and uncertainty in an already shaky global economy.80  The Wheatley 
Review argues that the transition to a new benchmark rate would impose too 
high a risk on the global financial market.81  The Wheatley Review examines 
not only how the shift might create financial instability as the markets try to 
understand the new rate, but also how the shift could result in large-scale 
litigation as parties who hold contracts referencing LIBOR attempt to 
                                                                                                                   
involved in setting LIBOR; and reducing the bank’s own LIBOR submissions in order to 
avoid negative media publicity during the financial crisis). 
 72 The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 5.  
 73 Id.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. at 1, 5–6.  
 77 Id. at 8–9.  
 78 Id. at 7.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id. (describing the vast number of contracts impacted by LIBOR, amounting to at least 
$300 trillion, as the main reason and concluding that opening those contracts up to litigation 
by replacing LIBOR would be too disruptive and costly, given that LIBOR has not been 
irreparably damaged). 
 81 Id.  
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renegotiate the terms.82  Additionally, while some might question whether 
LIBOR can really ever be reformed given the serious credibility issues the 
benchmark suffered after the rate-setting crisis, the Wheatley Review points 
out that the evidence does not bear out these concerns, considering that there 
has been “no noticeable decline in the use of LIBOR by market 
participants.”83  The Review goes on to point out that most market 
participants consulted on the issue argued for the use of some form of 
LIBOR rather than an alternative mechanism.84 However, the question 
remains whether the choice to merely reform rather than replace LIBOR is a 
feasible long-term solution.85  The Wheatley Review points out that an 
internationally coordinated effort to analyze potential alternative benchmarks 
is required before any major change is imposed.86 
Second, the Wheatley Review concluded that submissions must be 
verifiable based on transaction data, rather than simply based on each bank’s 
own estimate of the rate at which it could borrow on any given day.87  If a 
bank’s submission is verified with data about the bank’s transactions, rather 
than simply being taken at face value, the rate-setting process is less 
susceptible to manipulation.88  These strict procedures have both  internal 
and external regulatory components and contain both intermediate measures 
that allow for immediate implementation as well as longer-term mechanisms 
to prevent future scandals.89  
Finally, the Wheatley Review determined that the role of setting LIBOR 
should remain in the hands of the market participants, i.e., the financial 
institutions, rather than being set by the government.90  The Wheatley 
Review states that the setting of a global benchmark such as LIBOR is most 
appropriately done by a private entity that engages market participants in the 
development of the tool itself.91  The Review highlights two reasons for 
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keeping the LIBOR rate-setting process in the hands of private participants.  
First, it points to the role that market participants play in setting other 
benchmarks, even though none of those benchmarks are as widely used as 
LIBOR.  Second, it points to the expertise that market participants have 
about which benchmark to use for a particular type of financial contract.92  
However, the authors of the Review also designate a new external regulatory 
role over LIBOR submissions, stating that the role of such external bodies is 
to ensure that the benchmark is reliable and verifiable and maintains its 
integrity.93 
The Wheatley Review’s Ten-Point Plan stems entirely from these three 
conclusions and offers an implementation process for the U.K. going 
forward.94  It presents specific recommendations, which going forward will 
represent the U.K.’s entire regulatory response to the LIBOR rate-setting 
scandal.95  The BBA, in cooperation with U.K. regulators, began 
implementing many of these recommendations in 2013.96  LIBOR was sold 
to NYSE Euronet, the U.S. company that runs the New York Stock 
Exchange, in July of 2013.97  While NYSE Euronet has assured investors that 
it will continue to implement LIBOR reforms, LIBOR will no longer be 
under the purview of U.K. regulators, and no information is available as to 
whether the Wheatley review recommendations will be the regulations 
implemented.98 
B.  The Ten-Point Plan: Recommendations to the U.K. for a National 
Response to the LIBOR Rate-Setting Scandal 
The Ten-Point Plan has several overarching recommendations focused on 
making LIBOR a safer tool for setting worldwide interest rates.  The first of 
these recommendations is that the administration of and submission to 
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LIBOR should be statutorily regulated.99  This recommendation involves 
bringing LIBOR under the U.K.’s Financial Services and Markets Act 
(FSMA).100  Regulation will include an “Approved Persons regime,” which 
will require each bank submitting a LIBOR proposal to designate someone 
whose responsibility will be to manage the LIBOR submissions process and 
to submit independent audits periodically to regulators.101  Additionally, the 
recommendations include making the manipulation or attempted 
manipulation of LIBOR a criminal offense in the U.K., particularly given the 
likelihood that such manipulation “occur[s] in full awareness of the 
potentially serious and wide ranging [sic] impact that manipulation of 
LIBOR may have in light of its global use.”102   
The recommendations also take on an international regulatory slant, in 
that the Wheatley Review recognizes ongoing efforts by the EU and IOSCO 
to create general guidelines around benchmarks and acknowledges that the 
recommendations for LIBOR perhaps should extend to other financial 
benchmarks in the future.103  This Note proposes an addition to this idea, an 
examination of how an international body can enforce such guidelines and 
hold manipulators of benchmarks responsible at a global level.  This is 
particularly important considering the ongoing civil and criminal 
investigations by regulatory bodies around the world. An international 
enforcement mechanism is crucial in the case of LIBOR, given the far-
reaching consequences of any manipulation of such a rate. 
The second recommendation suggests the BBA turn over the 
administration of LIBOR to a new body, which would be responsible not 
only for compilation and distribution of the rate but also for providing 
internal governance and oversight.104  However, the Wheatley Review does 
not recommend that the new administrator of LIBOR be a public 
institution.105  Instead, the review recommends that LIBOR should remain a 
market-led benchmark and should be administered by a private entity.106  The 
reasons for this conclusion are grounded on the belief that LIBOR must be 
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 100 Id. at 11.  
 101 Id.; Maureen Kraten & Michael Kraten, The Wheatley Report: A LIBOR Solution?, 
AQPQ BLOG, Oct. 8, 2012, http://aqpq.org/2012/10/08/the-wheatley-report-a-libor-solution/. 
 102 The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 18.  
 103 Id. at 13.  
 104 Id. at 8.  
 105 Id. at 22.  
 106 Id.  
506 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 42:491 
 
 
able to evolve to meet the needs of the market and that a private organization 
will have a greater incentive to ensure that flexibility.107   
The Wheatley Review also states that other problems could arise if 
LIBOR was administered by a public agency.  It specifically raises a concern 
about establishing a global precedent of transferring other benchmarks to 
public entities for administration rather than simply oversight and 
regulation.108  Again, here the authors of the Wheatley Review recognize the 
important role that LIBOR plays in the global financial market and how 
regulation and oversight of LIBOR may impact international regulatory 
policy and precedent.  
Building upon the transfer of LIBOR from BBA administration, the third 
recommendation is that the new administrator of LIBOR conduct ongoing 
surveillance to ensure that LIBOR submissions are accurate and statistically 
valid.109  First, the review recommends that the BBA delegate the process of 
transferring LIBOR to the new administrator to an independent committee 
put together by the British government and the FSA.110  This committee will 
then be responsible for ensuring that the new administrator reforms the 
LIBOR governance structure to increase its credibility.111  
While the Wheatley Review allows for some flexibility in establishing the 
new governance structure, the review makes clear the purposes of such a 
structure, including requiring the new administrator “to analyse [sic] and 
scrutinise [sic] submissions from contributing banks.”112  Additionally, the 
Review strongly recommends that the structure “include a prominent 
decision-making and oversight role conducted by an independent and 
powerful committee with the ability to operate autonomously.”113 
Additionally, the Wheatley Review recommendations provide for the 
administrator to take on some specific roles “in order to ensure that 
confidence in the integrity of LIBOR as a benchmark is widely restored.”114  
These recommendations are particularly focused on ensuring the integrity 
and accuracy of the member banks’ submissions process.  Included in these 
recommendations are requirements that the administrator ensure that LIBOR 
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is not reserved only for specific market participants, that the bank 
submissions are strictly scrutinized both before and after publication utilizing 
statistical analysis, and that a process for accepting banks as members is 
clearly developed.115 
The next recommendation also encompasses the role of the independent 
oversight committee.116  The Wheatley Review particularly recommends 
involving the oversight committee in the development of a code of conduct 
for contributing banks, the administrator, and the committee itself.117  The 
purpose of this oversight committee is to provide an additional layer of 
transparency, and to this end the review authors recommend that the 
committee’s meetings should be published along with details of elections to 
the committee.118  However, the review also recommends that such 
membership not include regulators, as the purpose of the committee is to 
establish an internal oversight mechanism that works in tandem with the 
additional external regulation of LIBOR.119  
Most of these recommendations are focused on the establishment of 
external LIBOR structures, but questions remain regarding the role that 
international players may have in the governance of the new LIBOR 
structure.  Given that the existing LIBOR board represents banks from 
around the world,120 it is also unclear whether the home base of LIBOR 
should remain in the U.K. and how the make-up of the membership board 
will reflect the global nature of LIBOR, given that the responsibility for 
regulation under this new plan will lie solely with the U.K.121  
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The fourth recommendation in the ten-point plan shifts gears into concern 
over the specific rules governing LIBOR.122  This recommendation requires 
immediate compliance with the guidelines from the banks making LIBOR 
submissions.123  Particularly, immediate compliance is sought on 
requirements that banks support their submissions to LIBOR with 
transactional data.124 The authors of the Wheatley Review suggest some 
intermediate submission guidelines to govern this process while the formal 
code of conduct and regulatory guidelines continue to be developed.125  
These intermediate guidelines set out the specific types of data that banks 
should use to verify their submissions.  Because not all banks borrow funds 
daily, as every bank does not need to borrow money daily to meet business 
needs, the data requirements must be specific to govern submissions not 
based on actual borrowing rates for the day.126  Examples of some types of 
transactions a bank could use to verify its submission include transactions in 
the unsecured inter-bank deposit market or other unsecured deposit markets, 
such as certificates of deposit and commercial paper.127   
The goal of utilizing these intermediate measures is to introduce much-
needed immediate reforms before the full regulatory recommendations.128  
Interestingly, the Wheatley Review notes that these submission guidelines 
are modeled on those set forth in a settlement between the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and Barclays Bank.129  Again, this 
type of transfer of regulatory models across national boundaries reveals the 
closely tied global regulatory market into which these new LIBOR 
regulations are being introduced. 
With recommendation five, the Wheatley Review again focuses on longer 
term solutions with the recommendation that the future administrator of 
LIBOR set forth a Code of Conduct to “serve as a manual for internal 
governance and organisation [sic] of LIBOR submission.”130  Additionally, 
this code of conduct should serve as a guide to the FSA regulation of 
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LIBOR.131  However, the authors of the Wheatley Review recommend that 
industry participants, not the FSA, draft the code.132  
The Wheatley Review outlines the code of conduct’s scope to include 
information about submission procedures, internal system and control 
policies, requirements for submitting banks regarding recording transactional 
data, and industry guidelines for assurance and audit.133  Essentially this code 
of conduct would operate as a detailed rulebook for both LIBOR contributors 
as well as the administrator of LIBOR and the independent review 
committee.134 
Recommendations six through nine deal with immediate actions to be 
taken by the BBA while other recommendations are still in the 
implementation phase.135  The sixth recommendation directs the BBA to stop 
compiling and publishing LIBOR for any currency for which the trade data is 
insufficient to corroborate the submissions.136  At the time of the Wheatley 
Review’s publication, LIBOR was published for ten currencies and fifteen 
different maturities.137  The authors of the review recommend that where the 
volume of transactions for a LIBOR benchmark is low or where another 
benchmark or domestic alternative is generally preferred, that currency 
should be phased out of the submissions process.138  The purpose of the 
phasing out, according to the review, is to ensure that LIBOR submissions 
can be verified by supporting transactional data.139 
Accordingly, the Wheatley Review recommends that some currencies, 
including the Australian Dollar, the Canadian Dollar, the Danish Kroner, the 
New Zealand Dollar, and the Swedish Kronor, be phased out after the BBA 
creates a plan in consultation with both users and submitters.140  In order to 
implement this recommendation, it will be vital that the administrator of 
LIBOR reach out to market participants and users of LIBOR in these 
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currencies to avoid creating large unintended consequences from the phase-
out, such as large-scale litigation to redefine outstanding contracts that 
reference LIBOR in these currencies.141  Again, the implementation of this 
recommendation will require that the administrator and regulator of LIBOR 
have a clear understanding of the impact these decisions regarding LIBOR 
will have on the global financial market. 
The seventh recommendation directs the BBA to cease the daily 
publication of the LIBOR submissions and, instead, to shift to publishing 
each bank’s submissions every three months.142  This recommendation arises 
from a concern that the daily publication of rates, while thought to promote 
transparency and accountability for the sake of accuracy of submissions, 
actually facilitated the manipulation surrounding the recent LIBOR 
scandal.143  As mentioned earlier, the BBA publishes each bank’s individual 
submission after the LIBOR rate is set for the day.144  The thinking behind 
this publication process s is that the banks, knowing the rates will be 
published, are less likely to submit false rates that can be identified by the 
public.145  However, in reality, this immediate publication could instead 
facilitate manipulation, in that the publication allows banks to estimate the 
likely impact of their submission in advance and therefore tamper with that 
submission to get the desired result.146  Also, the LIBOR submission by a 
particular bank often provides an implicit signal to the public regarding that 
bank’s credit-worthiness;147 therefore, daily publication may create an 
incentive to a bank to submit a lower rate to uphold this implication.148  The 
recommendation of the Wheatley Review is to delay the submission for at 
least three months in order to circumvent both of these potential incentives 
for manipulation and to retain the transparency and accountability goals of 
publication.149  
The eighth recommendation in the ten-point plan focuses on broadening 
participation in LIBOR, suggesting that banks, even those currently not on 
the LIBOR board, should be encouraged to participate as widely as possible 
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in the process of compiling the rate.150  The Wheatley Review even suggests 
making such participation compulsory through new regulatory reforms if 
necessary.151  The Wheatley Review notes that the broader the sample size of 
banks submitting to set the LIBOR rate, the more accurate and credible the 
rate will become.152  This increase in accuracy and credibility is specifically 
derived from the decreasing impact that individual submissions will have on 
the published rates and the hope that the rate overall may become more 
representative of the actual global market.153  The role of international 
regulatory bodies in encouraging broader participation is vital to ensuring 
this recommendation meets its actual goal, particularly considering the 
importance of LIBOR in the global financial market.154  In the review, 
international authorities are asked to engage in encouraging participation 
among banks in their jurisdictions.155  The ninth recommendation focuses on 
limiting the risk posed by a potential failure of LIBOR to market 
participants.156  Again, LIBOR is the rate against which the interest rates on 
trillions of dollars of financial instruments around the world are set.157  One 
of the fears that the Wheatley Review raises about the idea of scrapping 
LIBOR for another benchmark rate is the risk that such a decision would 
pose to market participants who used LIBOR as a benchmark for these 
trillions of dollars of contract liabilities.158  The Wheatley Review 
acknowledges the problems that would result from a failure to publish 
LIBOR—even for one day—and states that the current contingency plan for 
such a failure in most standard LIBOR-based financial contracts is 
unworkable.159  Most contracts referencing LIBOR require an alternate rate 
to be calculated by simply replicating, at the participant level, the submission 
process.160  Just as the LIBOR submission process involves a set of banks 
calling in to report their proposed borrowing rates that day, the contingency 
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plan requires the market participant to call a set of reference banks to get 
similar quotes for the currency and maturity specified in the contract.161  
The reasons this contingency plan is unworkable are three-fold:  
1. The sheer volume of contracts referencing LIBOR 
around the world makes the number of contacting 
market participants unwieldy;  
2. If LIBOR has failed, then the reference banks, who 
are also likely to be the banks submitting to LIBOR, 
may not be prepared to provide such quotes; and 
3. Because the use of such contingencies would be so 
widespread, differences in individual contract 
provisions could lead counterparties to have different 
interest rates payable between them.162 
“The Wheatley Review recommends that industry bodies that publish 
standardized legal documentation in relation to contracts referencing LIBOR, 
as well as LIBOR users, . . .  develop robust contingency procedures to take 
effect in the event of a longer-term disruption to the publication of 
LIBOR.”163  However, this recommendation again highlights the on-going 
need for international regulatory cooperation.  Currently, many of these 
industry players who publish such model contracts operate across 
international channels.164  For example, the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association, which developed the commonly used ISDA Master 
Agreement, has members from over fifty-nine countries.165  In order to get 
this standardized contingency plan in place, organizations such as ISDA will 
have to come to a cooperative solution trans-nationally on an alternative 
benchmark to use if LIBOR is not available.   
The final recommendation focuses on international cooperation and is key 
to the purposes of this Note.166  The tenth recommendation of the Wheatley 
Review ten-point plan calls for the U.K. to work closely with the 
international community regarding the long-term future of LIBOR and other 
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global benchmarks, including the establishment of principles for other global 
benchmarks, both those already in use and those that might be created in the 
future.167  First, the authors of the review note that international regulatory 
authorities should take up a discussion of the existing uses of rates such as 
LIBOR and the role regulators should play in effecting a potential shift 
toward an alternative benchmark.168  Second, the authors of the review 
examine the role of the international community in developing a clear set of 
principles to govern the regulation of all benchmarks.169 
First, in looking at the role of international bodies in examining the 
potential to transition from LIBOR to an alternative global rate, the authors 
of the Wheatley Review recommend such a transition from LIBOR as 
necessary only when an alternative benchmark might be a more appropriate 
measure for setting the rate of a particular product.170  For example, if a 
financial product does not depend on interbank liquidity and credit risk, then 
LIBOR may be an inappropriate method for setting rates for that product 
because those factors are the primary considerations on which LIBOR is 
based.171  In these instances, the Wheatley Review believes that international 
regulators, brought together by a group such as ISDA, might be able to 
manage the risk posed for future contracts when the benchmark rate 
changes.172  Additionally, the Wheatley Review also believes that 
international regulators could encourage market participants to change their 
use of global benchmarks by encouraging the use of the reference rate that 
most fits the needs and requirements of a particular financial transaction, 
rather than the most common rate.173  However, as a review sponsored by the 
FSA—a U.K. regulatory entity—the Wheatley Review can offer little more 
than encouragement.  
Finally, the Wheatley Review notes the role the international community 
can play in establishing “principles for effective global benchmarks.”174  The 
Wheatley Review authors point to ongoing work that IOSCO and other 
international entities are currently beginning to undertake.  Particularly 
interesting is the IOSCO Board-Level Task Force on Financial Market 
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Benchmarks, established to look at benchmarks other than LIBOR and 
chaired by Martin Wheatley, author of the Wheatley Review, and Gary 
Gensler, Chairman of the CFTC.175  The purpose of the taskforce is to 
identify benchmark rates, define the types of benchmarks relevant to 
financial markets, propose regulatory and oversight policies for these 
benchmarks, and develop global policy guidance and principles for the 
benchmarks in government regulation and self-regulation.176  But, the 
establishment of this committee raises questions of how these international 
policy-setting efforts may result in actual enforcement of regulations, 
particularly any focus that may be given to establishing such enforcement 
mechanisms at an international level. 
C.  International Regulatory Responses: Fitting LIBOR into Current Models 
for International Regulatory Response 
Two of the most important bodies that provide international responses to 
banking regulation issues are the Basel Committee and IOSCO.177  
Examining how these bodies currently operate may provide some insight into 
how the new regulatory responses to LIBOR can be implemented and 
enforced at an international level.  Both of these bodies currently operate 
through a similar membership structure, issuing guidelines developed 
cooperatively among members but implemented nationally by the regulatory 
bodies that make up those memberships.178  However, the two bodies have 
different missions and areas of coverage.179  While IOSCO governs the 
regulation of the securities markets, such as how to trade securities, the Basel 
Committee examines the regulation of banks themselves, looking at the 
amount of liquidity a bank should have on hand.180  As LIBOR is primarily a 
benchmark used in the setting of rates for securities transactions and IOSCO 
is establishing the Task Force on Financial Market Benchmarks, IOSCO’s 
model is most relevant to the international regulatory response discussed in 
this Note.181  
                                                                                                                   
 175 Id. at 56–57.  
 176 Id. at 57.  
 177 Singher, supra note 66, at 1461–63 (describing the role of these bodies in issuing 
guidelines for the regulation of derivatives-related risks); IOSCO Historical Background, 
supra note 67; About Basel Committee, supra note 67. 
 178 IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 67; About Basel Committee, supra note 67. 
 179 IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 67; About Basel Committee, supra note 67. 
 180 IOSCO Historical Background, supra note 67; About Basel Committee, supra note 67. 
 181 BBALIBOR Basics, supra note 20; The Wheatley Review, supra note 8, at 56–57.  
2014] ALL TOGETHER NOW  515 
 
 
Securities markets allow for the exchange of a variety of financial 
instruments, many of which use LIBOR as a benchmark, including stocks, 
treasury stocks, certificates of interest in profit-sharing agreements, 
investment contracts, and more.182  Founded in 1983, IOSCO shifted from an 
organization focused solely on the Americas to one focused on creating a 
global body for the cooperative development of securities regulations.183  
IOSCO has adopted a three-fold purpose:  
1. To cooperate in the development, implementation, 
and promotion of international standards of regulation 
and enforcement;  
2. To enhance investor protection and confidence in the 
securities markets by exchanging information about 
and cooperating in the enforcement of misconduct as 
it relates to the supervision of securities markets; and 
3. To exchange information at a global level for the 
purpose of strengthening markets and providing 
appropriate regulation.184 
As discussed previously, IOSCO is already working to provide regulatory 
guidance around both LIBOR and global benchmarks generally by creating 
the Task Force on Financial Market Benchmarks.185  The focus of this task 
force is to develop policy guidelines for the regulation of global benchmarks, 
including but not limited to LIBOR.186  The task force, in conjunction with 
IOSCO more generally, will also develop recommendations for how 
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countries should enforce regulatory policies within their own regulatory 
structures.187   
Enforcement of banking regulation is particularly important in the LIBOR 
crisis, as the investigations into the conspiracy cross multiple national 
boundaries.188  IOSCO first addressed this need for international cooperation 
in enforcement in 2002, and again in 2012 when the members of IOSCO 
drafted the “Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information” (IOSCO 
MOU).189  This IOSCO MOU provided signatory countries with the right to 
exchange information across national borders to assist one another in the 
investigation of regulatory violations.190  The purpose of IOSCO was to 
create a cooperative commitment to this type of information sharing and to 
show a desire to engage in international enforcement of national regulatory 
policy.191  The IOSCO MOU contains provisions that provide for the sharing 
of both information about ongoing investigations and facts discovered in 
bringing criminal charges, as well as ones not allowing national policy or 
legislation barring the sharing of such information to hinder participation as 
required by the MOU.192  To become a signatory to the IOSCO MOU, a 
regulatory institution must show its ability to comply with the requirements, 
although non-signatory countries could endorse and utilize the MOU’s 
guidelines to inform their regulatory policies without making such a 
showing.193  To prove such ability, the regulatory institutions must show that 
the laws of their nation are in compliance with the general policy guidelines 
set forth by IOSCO in regards to securities regulation.194  This additional 
requirement not only promotes regulatory consistency but also provides 
additional ammunition to ensure that information collected by signatory 
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 189 Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation 
and the Exchange of Information, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, 
May 2002, 1 [hereinafter IOSCO MOU]. 
 190 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Announces IOSCO Unveiling 
of Multilateral Agreement on Enforcement Cooperation (Oct. 31, 2003) (on file with author). 
 191 Id.  
 192 IOSCO MOU, supra note 189, at 3–4.  
 193 Id. at 11–12  
 194 Janet Austin, IOSCO’S Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning 
Consultation, Cooperation and the Exchange of Information, 23 CRIM. L.F. 393, 395 
(describing the impact of the IOSCO MOU on the criminal prosecution of securities fraud at a 
national level).  
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countries in investigations is useful to others.195  However, this tool did not 
work in the case of LIBOR, primarily because the benchmark was 
unregulated prior to the rate-setting conspiracy.196  
As this task force moves forward, this author is interested to see how the 
following questions get answered.  First, will the recommendations provided 
by the Wheatley Review will largely reflect the general guidelines developed 
by this task force for global benchmarks more broadly?  Second, will the task 
force recommends replacing LIBOR altogether or will it develop a more 
precise set of tools both broadening the number of global benchmarks and 
the regulatory bodies governing them?  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The results of the LIBOR crisis and its impact on the international 
regulatory environment are still unraveling.  However, the recent global 
banking and regulatory crises, such as the liquidity and credit crisis of 2008 
and the LIBOR rate-setting scandal, raise an additional question about 
whether the mechanisms currently in place sufficiently address the needs of 
the international banking industry.  While the Wheatley Review notes that its 
purpose is only to deal with LIBOR regulation from a national perspective, 
the review calls for international action on these issues.  International action 
would provide consistency across borders as well as provide clear 
expectations to financial markets regarding ongoing regulatory decisions.  
The need for the stability provided by international standards is even more 
clear, given that LIBOR was recently sold to a U.S.-based company, 
transferring regulatory responsibility to the U.S.  Currently, without global 
regulatory policy for benchmarks, no evidence exists to ensure that the 
Wheatley Review recommendations currently being implemented will 
continue upon the transfer of LIBOR to this new owner.  
IOSCO currently appears to be the place where these issues will be 
addressed, given the establishment of the committee to study global 
benchmarks such as LIBOR.  However, the depth and breadth of global 
financial crises of recent years raises additional questions of whether purely 
cooperative models such as IOSCO are sufficient to regulate the global 
banking industry.   
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Perhaps the banking industry should move away from a purely 
cooperative model and look to a more binding model of regulatory 
enforcement.  A binding regulatory enforcement entity could not only 
provide enforcement between state actors but also allow private actors to 
hold banks and financial institutions responsible before an international 
tribunal.  The current lack of an international legal body to enforce such 
public and private rights of action is particularly pertinent to LIBOR, given 
the fact that no regulatory body had taken on an active role in overseeing 
LIBOR.  Arguably that misstep resulted in the failure to stop the conspiracy 
early on.  
The current IOSCO entity or the BASEL III could expand to include such 
capacity similar to how the World Trade Organization writes a dispute 
settlement system into its negotiated agreements.197  However, to encompass 
such a shift in roles these existing bodies, particularly IOSCO, would need to 
change their current models of gaining international cooperation, in several 
key ways.  First, IOSCO will need to begin monitoring new and current 
global benchmarks and financial tools to ensure that these tools are under 
regulatory purview.  For example, if IOSCO was monitoring LIBOR’s 
regulation, the body could have played a role in influencing the British 
regulatory entities’ decision not to regulate LIBOR and curbed the crisis by 
placing pressure on these entities to regulate the benchmark.  Additionally, 
IOSCO does not currently contain a dispute-resolution arm, and it would 
either need to form one or to delegate dispute-resolution authority to another 
body in order to create a forum for hearing such disputes.  In this way, when 
the LIBOR crisis comes to a head, the dispute resolution body could play a 
role in determining state actor responsibility in failing to regulate.  
A lack of regulation of financial tools and benchmarks was a key issue in 
the explosion of the financial crises of recent years.  From the subprime 
mortgage market to LIBOR, the failure of state actors to properly regulate 
financial instruments created a ripple effect in economies across the globe 
costing both public and private actors billions of dollars in recent years.  An 
international approach is essential in preventing such future crises and 
mitigating the current impacts of such crises.  However, the current 
mechanisms are insufficient to meet such demands.  Over the next several 
years, the financial industry will need to look to models in international trade 
and human rights for examples of how to create a global approach to 
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regulation that balances the need for flexibility with the need for 
enforcement. 
  

